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"Solely for Investment Purposes": Evolution of a
Statutory Exemption Under Clayton Section 7
Section 7 of the Clayton Act' prohibits a corporation from acquiring another corporation in whole or in part, when the acquisition may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly.
The purpose of the Act is to "cope with monopolistic tendencies in
their incipiency."'2 Not every acquisition between competing corporations is illegal, s however, and the statute specifically exempts
some types of acquisitions from section 7 coverage.4 One such ex1.

15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) provides in pertinent partNo corporation engaged in Commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commeice, wherein any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capit4l and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one
or more corporations engaged in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any
section of the country the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of
the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
This section shall not apply to corporations purchasing such stock solely for
investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in
attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition. Nor shall anything contained in this section prevent a corporation engaged in commerce from
causing the formation of subsidiary corporations for the actual carrying on of their
immediate lawful business, or the natural and legitimate branches or extensions
thereof, or from owning and holding all or a part of the stock of such subsidiary
corporations, when the effect of such formation is not to substantially lessen
competition.
2. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 4293, 4296.
3. "Mere acquisition by one corporation of the stock of a competitor, even though it
result in some lessening of competition, is not forbidden; the act deals only with such acquisitions as probably will result in lessening competition to a substantial degree. . . ." International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 298 (1930); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. ICC, 66 F.2d 37
(3d Cir. 1933), afl'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 291 U.S. 651 (1934). See Swift
& Co. v. FTC, 8 F.2d 595, 597 (7th Cir. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
4. "Exemption" has been defined as "a broad concept to signify any statute or judicial
doctrine which expressly or impliediy frees certain conduct or persons from usual rules or
competition insisted upon for activity in or affecting interstate trade or commerce." Pogue,
The Rationale of Exemptions from Antitrust, 19 ABA AmrrrusT L.J. 313 (1961) [hereinaf-
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emption provides that section 7 does not apply to corporations
purchasing stock solely for investment when ownership is not used
to bring about, or attempt to bring about, the substantial lessening
of competition.'
Antitrust defendants periodically have asserted this "solely for
investment purposes" exemption,' but usually with little success. 7
ter cited as Pogue].
15 U.S.C. § 18, para. 6 (1976) states:
Nothing contained in this section shall apply to transactions duly consummated
pursuant to authority given by the Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Power Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission in the exercise of its jurisdiction
under section 79j of this title, the United States Maritime Commission, or the
Secretary of Agriculture under any statutory provision vesting such power in such
Commission, Secretary, or Board.
Exemption by virtue of agency approval or subsidiary relationship are beyond the scope
of this article. See generally McGovern, Antitrust Exemptions for Regulated Industries, 20
FED. BAR J. 10 (1960); Pogue, supra note 4; Robinson, Antitrust Developments: 1973, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 163 (1974).
5. "Investment" has been defined as:
[a word of] broad application, including in its various uses purchases of practically
every kind and description and for every purpose. One of those purposes is the
purchase of property for the sake of the direct return which can be realized from
such property. . . . It ordinarily signifies the use of money to purchase property,
personal or real, for any purpose from which income of profit is expected, presently or in the future, sepculatively or permanently.
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. ICC, 66 F.2d 37, 39 (3rd Cir. 1933), afl'd per curiam by an equally
divided court, 291 U.S. 651 (1934). But see Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 476 F.2d 687, 693 (2d Cir. 1973). The text of the pertinent provision of the statute is
reproduced at note 1, supra.
6. The provision is an exemption rather than a defense. United States v. Tracinda Inv.
Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 1979). See VON KALINOWSKI, 16F BusiNsS OsiANIZATIONS, ANTITRUST LAwS AND TRADE REGULATION § 44.01[2] (1980) [hereinafter cited as
VON KALINOWSIU].
In any antitrust proceeding, the defendant may avoid liability in one of three
ways. First, he may rely on the plaintiff's failure to establish all the requisite jurisdictional and substantive elements of the offense charged. Second, he may successfully interpose a statutory or other defense. Third, he may demonstrate that a
particular group, industry, or business of which he is a member is exempt....
This distinction is especially significant in the per se area of liability, where,
once the basic elements of the offense have been established, no defense is permitted. Even in the area of non per se offenses, it may be easier to establish exempt
status than a statutory defense.
Id. Some courts and at least one commentator have characterized the provision as an
affirmative defense. Denison Mines Ltd. v. Michigan Chem. Corp., 469 F.2d 1301, 1309 (7th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 738 n.87 (D. Md.
1976); ANTITRUsT ADVISOR 137-38 (C. Hills ed. 1971). For a discussion of affirmative defenses, see generally F. JAMES AND G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 138-43 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as JAMES and HAZARD].
7. In the following cases, the defendants failed to qualify for the exemption. United
States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); Swift & Co. v. FTC, 8 F.2d
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Commentators have suggested that the provision is without practical significance. 8 The exemption was raised and was held to preclude section 7 liability, however, in two recent district court decisions, Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co.9 and United States v. Tracinda
Investment Corp.10 These decisions suggest that the "solely for
investment purposes" exemption may be a viable defense to antitrust actions brought pursuant to section 7.11
This article will review investment exemption cases and examine
factors which courts have used in determining whether purchases
were made solely for investment purposes. The two district court
decisions which may suggest a new trend in section 7 analysis will
be discussed and analyzed. Finally, this article will explore the implications of the possible resurrection of this exemption as an effective tool in antitrust litigation.
Focus OF INVESTMENT EXEMPTION ANALYSIS: THE CONTROL
FACTOR

The definitive factor in determining whether the investment exemption applies is whether the stock was purchased to gain control

595 (7th Cir. 1925), rev. on other grounds, 272 U.S. 554 (1926); Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v.
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. IMl. 1968); United
States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), affd per curiam, 385 U.S.
37 (1966); Vanadium Corp. of America v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686 (D. Del.
1962); Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Mich.), af'd per curiam, 280
F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. CubanAmerican Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), alI'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958);
Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.), affd, 206 F.2d 738
(2d Cir. 1953).
8. "Although this provision is not of great practical significance, its application should be
carefully considered when any acquisition is attacked." E. KiNTNm , AN ANmTrusT PRimER
98 (2d ed. 1973). See also Jacobs, Acquisitions, 43 ABA ANTIRUST L.J. 552, 559 (1974).
9. 411 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
10. 477 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
11. Congress also apparently continues to consider the investment purposes exemption
to be important. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Amendment, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a(c)(9) (1976), holds exempt from premerger notification requirements "acquisitions,
solely for the purpose of investment of voting securities, if as a result of such acquisition,
the securities acquired or held do not exceed 10 per centum of the outstanding voting securities of the issuer." Discussion of the Rodino Amendment is beyond the scope of this article.
See generally 16A VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 6 § 11.07A[4]; Note, The Goal of the New
Premerger Notification Requirements: Preliminary Relief Against Anticompetitive Mergers, 1979 DUKE L.J. 249; Note, Stop, Look and Listen: PremergerNotification Under The
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 1979 DUKE L.J. 355.
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over the acquired company. 12 Numerical or majority shareholder

control is not essential to establish a section 7 violation. Thus,
minority share purchases may establish a violation of the Clayton

Act if the purchases were made in an effort to control or substantially influence the company whose stock was acquired.1 8 Courts
have used various criteria to determine whether the purchasing
company intends to exercise control.
Express Intent to Control
When the purchaser expressly states an intent to control, the determination is a fairly simple one." For example, in Briggs Manu12. The courts ostensibly base their decisions on objective factors. See notes 59-65 infra
and accompanying text.
One court which considered a § 7 violation in conjunction with a Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 claim seemed to adopt the Rule 12b-2 definition of control for the antitrust context
as well. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951, 965 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). "The term 'control'. . . means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to
direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through
the ownership or voting securities, by contract or otherwise." 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(f)
(1980).
The decisions which address the exemption issue generally do not attempt to define control. The courts themselves seem unclear on what they mean by control. The courts seem to
be concerned about the possibility of manipulating management in the day-to-day decision
making process. When one considers the role of shareholders, the only significant method of
controlling or influencing management decisions would be by establishing on the board a
director whom the shareholder could manipulate. Otherwise, the shareholders' opportunity
to directly affect the course of the company would be limited to voting on items that require
direct shareholder approval, such as an extraordinary change in the corporate organization.
13. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485, 500-01 (1967)
(20% holding); Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 694 (2d
Cir. 1973) (Gulf acquired approximately 4% of A. & P. stock before making a tender offer);
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 499 F. Supp. 951, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(Curtiss-Wright purchased 9.9% of Kennecott's shares); American Crystal Sugar Co. v.
Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp., 387, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), af'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d
Cir. 1958) (23% holdings).
14. Express intent becomes important in other contexts. For example, the Williams Act,
section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976), requires
that any person, after acquiring ownership of more than five percent of any stock subject to
the Act must make a report to the issuer of the stock. Section 13(d)(C) (1976) requires the
purchaser to file a statement with the S.E.C. and send a statement to the issuer:
if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire control of
the business of the issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals which such
persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to or merge it with any
other persons, or to make any other major change in its business or corporate
structure.
Id. While a discussion of the Williams Act is beyond the scope of this article, the issue is
raised because of the § 7 allegations which are often made in the context of a tender offer or
takeover bid. See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus. Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d
Cir. 1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y.
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facturing Co. v. Crane Co., 15 the court denied the exemption because the Crane chairman had admitted that Crane's intention had
never been to purchase Briggs stock as an investment. Additional
factors which supported denial of the exemption included: 1)
Crane had proposed to purchase Briggs' assets rather than build
its own plants in the midwest market; 2) the financial press, including the Wall Street Journal, gave a great deal of publicity to
Crane's intentions; 3) Crane's purchase of Briggs stock at above
market prices further evidenced Crane's systematic approach to
gaining control, and 4) Crane nominated seven individuals to the
board of directors.1 6 Furthermore, because of Michigan's cumulative voting statute, Crane could elect one and possibly two directors to Briggs' board. The court had no reason to suspect the integrity of the nominees, but it expected them to be sympathetic to
Crane's interests.1 7 Because of Crane's expressed intent to gain
control rather than to procure an investment opportunity, the
court granted a preliminary injunction against Crane, even though
Crane held only a 22% minority interest in Briggs. 8 The court
concluded that the effect of Crane's acquisition may have been to
substantially lessen competition in the plumbing fixtures and sup1978); Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Texasgulf, Inc. v.
Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
In describing the use of a § 7 allegation to thwart a takeover attempt, Judge Friendly
stated:
Drawing Excalibur from a scabbard where it would doubtless have remained
sheathed in the face of a friendly offer, the target company typically hopes to
obtain a temporary injunction which may frustrate the acquisition since the offering company may well decline the expensive gambit of a trial or if it persists, the
long lapse of time could so change conditions that the offer will fail even if, after a
full trial and appeal, it should be determined that no antitrust violation has been
shown.
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 883 (1974).
For examples of express intent to control, see United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 353 U.S. 586, 602 (1957) (annual reports and other documents revealed duPont's intent
to establish itself as G.M.'s primary supplier of fabrics and finishes); Vanadium Corp. of
America v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686, 693 (D. Del. 1962) (chairman to Susquehanna's board stated that his company could, and expected to, acquire as much as 51% of
Vanadium stock if necessary in order to take Vanadium over); American Crystal Sugar Co.
v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), afr'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d
Cir. 1958) (chairman stated that his "ultimate objective" was to create a joint venture
through merger or common control).
15. 185 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd per curiam, 280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960).
16. Id. at 180.
17. Id. at 181.
18. Id.
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plies industry. 9
In contrast to an expressed intent to obtain control, which obviously negates an investment purpose, an expressed intent to the
contrary, i.e., a commitment to maintain a "hands-off" posture,
may not be sufficient to bring a merger within the exemption. This
situation was presented in United States v. Wilson Sporting
Goods Co.,2 0 where Wilson sought to acquire Nissen Corp., the
leading manufacturer and seller of gymnastic equipment. Wilson
claimed that it viewed Nissen as "simply an attractive investment."2' Furthermore, Wilson intended to keep George Nissen,
president and majority shareholder, at the head of the business. A
proxy statement sent to both companies' shareholders pledged that
although Nissen Corp. would become a wholly owned subsidiary of
Wilson, management of Nissen would remain essentially intact.
Wilson also pledged not to intermingle any facilities, sales operation, or company functions.2
Although the district court recognized that Wilson would probably abide by its representation under the proxy statement to maintain separate corporate identities, the court remained uneasy about
possible unforseen factors which might occur after the merger.
Specifically, the court hypothesized that should Mr. Nissen leave
the company for any reason, Wilson would have less incentive to
maintain segregated operations.2 8 Wilson also would be likely to
affect Nissen's sales, should Nissen's share of the market continue
to decline. Given the "well-known tendencies of human conduct, '"
the court did not believe that Wilson would permit Nissen to function as independently as before and not exert any control over
Nissen. Looking as the probable, rather than actual, effects of the
merger, the court reasoned that it was likely that Wilson's eco19. For other examples of cases in which an expressed intent to control was held to
negate an investment purpose, see Vanadium Corp. of America v. Susquehanna Corp., 203
F. Supp. 686, 693 (D. Del. 1962) (board chairman stated that his company could and expected to acquire the necessary stock to take plaintiff over); American Crystal Sugar Co. v.
Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d
Cir. 1958) (board chairman stated that his "ultimate objective" was to create a joint venture
through common control or merger). Cf. Apolo Bus. Mach. Inc. v. Compucorp, 1976-2 Trade
Cas. V 61,015 at 69,476-77 (N.D. Ala. 1976) (Company's acquisition of 24% voting stock did
not violate § 7 because the company had no voting control, did not elect a director on acquired company's board, and there was no showing of any lessening of competition).
20. 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. IMI.1968).
21. Id. at 547.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 556.
24. Id., quoting United States v. Pennzoil, 252 F. Supp. 962, 984 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
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nomic strength would benefit Nissen's sales at the expense of competitors and that Nissen would keep its current market share
rather than face further decline." While noting that Wilson would
be obligated under the proxy statement to segregate the businesses,26 the court declined to accept this as objective evidence of
Wilson's investment intent.
Implied Intent to Control
An expressed intent to acquire stock in order to gain control of a
company clearly negates an investment purpose. Similarly, courts
have had little trouble inferring an implied intent to control from
acquiring companies' actions. For example, courts have inferred an
intent to control the management and policies of the acquired
company from an attempt by the shareholder company to elect a
director to the board of the acquired company.27
The decision in Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co. s exemplifies the rationale of implied intent. Benrus, a direct competitor of Hamilton, acquired a 23% interest in Hamilton Watch Co.
Benrus could not acquire a controlling interest because of a tenyear voting trust established by Hamilton shareholders in response
to Benrus' program of acquisition. Benrus intended to vote its
shares cumulatively to elect a director for a three year term.2' The

trial court found that Benrus had no power to control Hamilton
25. 288 F. Supp. at 556. The court seems to bootstrap an argument that "the merger
cannot be defended as a mere 'investment' once it appears that the acquiring company intends to vote its stock and exercise control." Id. The court bases its argument on mere
speculation, however, as to what would happen if Mr. Nissen left the company or if Nissen's
market share should decline. But see United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp.
1093, 1100-01 (C.D. Cal. 1979) in which the court refused to speculate about future events.
26. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 556 (N.D. Il. 1968).
27. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 604 (1957) (chairman
of the board of the two involved corporations was the same person); Gulf & W. Indus., Inc.
v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066, 1068 (S.D.N.Y.), af/'d, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.
1973) (president of acquiring company was major shareholder and director of target's primary competitor); Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F.Supp. 177, 181 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd per
curiam, 280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960) (directors elected to the board); American Crystal
Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), afl'd, 259
F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 313
(D. Conn.), af'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953). Cf. Apolo Bus. Mach. Inc. v. Compucorp,
1976-2 Trade Cas. 1 61,015 at 69,477 (N.D. Ala. 1976) (no effort to put director on board).
28. 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953). At least one commentator has attached particular importance to this decision. 16A VON KALINOWSHI, supra note
6 § 11.07[3][a].
29. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 313 (D. Conn.), aff'd,
206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
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while the voting trust remained in effect, but if Benrus obtained
representation on the board, it could possibly bring about collaboration which would probably lessen competition."s Such representation would allow the Benrus board member access to confidential
information which could harm Hamilton by weakening Hamilton's
competitive position. A Benrus director would also have conflicting
loyalties in making management decisions. 3 '
Other factors considered in determining that Benrus' stock
purchases were not made solely for investment included: 1) Benrus
borrowed most of the $1,300,000 which it spent for Hamilton stock;
2) Benrus continued to purchase Hamilton stock in a rising market
over a six month period whereas under a pure investment strategy,
Benrus would have been more patient, especially since the market
returned to normal after Benrus stopped buying Hamilton stock;
3) Benrus could not show that the Hamilton stock was merely an
item in a diversified investment portfolio, and 4) Benrus showed a
clear hostility to the voting trust and stopped buying when the
voting trust consolidated control.3 2 Under these circumstances, the
court concluded that a finding that Benrus purchased Hamilton
stock for investment purposes would be "naive."3 3 The fact that
Benrus did not achieve the control it sought did not insulate the
company from possible antitrust liability. The court concluded
that acquisition of a non-controlling interest in a company could
still constitute a violation of section 7 if the acquisition were made
in an attempt to gain control which could reasonably be achieved
at the time the acquisition was made and which would substan30. The presence of such a director on the Hamilton board would create a situation
in which Benrus would have power to discourage the vigor of competition by
Hamilton and so to embarass and impede Hamilton's management that it might
well be driven to unwanted collaboration or to merger as the least of two evils.
Such a situation would constitute irreparable harm to Hamilton.
Id. at 314.
31. A director on Hamilton's board elected by Benrus would be in a position to
obtain confidential information of value to Benrus as a competitor, the disclosure
of which would be harmful to Hamilton and would materially impair its competitive position. In participating in the management, such a director would be subjected to frequent conflicts of loyalties involving decisions dependent upon the
exercise of his judgment faculties many of which would be of such a nature that it
would be impossible to demonstrate the presence or extent of the Benrus influence if that had been a factor.
Id. at 314. See also Vanadium Corp. of America v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686,
694 (D. Del. 1962).
32. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 316 (D.Conn. 1953).
33. Id.
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tially lessen competition. 4
Just as voting shares to elect a director has been held to manifest an intent to control the acquired company, a corporation's
"track record" 5 also may be considered to indicate a purpose other
than investment. In Gulf and Western Industries, Inc. v. Great
' 7
6
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Gulf's "well-established practice"
of acquiring companies by first purchasing a minority interest
sufficient to allow Gulf to "insinuate" ' " itself onto the board convinced the court that Gulf did not wish merely to invest in A & P.19
Rather, the court determined that Gulf intended to obtain control
of A & P, or in the alternative, to strongly influence A & P's
management.4"
More subtle actions which affect relationships between companies by substantially influencing management also may be found
to indicate an attempt to control the acquired firm. The United
States Supreme Court, in United States v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co.,"1 considered duPont's claim that it purchased a
23% interest in General Motors solely for investment. The Court
found, after examining duPont's annual reports, that duPont actually acquired the G.M. stock in order to expand and insure duPont's market for automotive fabrics and finishes.4' Furthermore,
a former duPont vice president had become G.M.'s vice president
in charge of the operations committee. This vice president kept
duPont informed of G.M.'s business affairs and intended to promote the use of duPont materials by General Motors.' The Court
reasoned that "lilt is not pure imagination to suppose that such
surveillance from that source made an impressive impact upon

34. Id.
35. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066, 1072
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973). Accord Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944
(1962). "It is our opinion that the cumulative effect of a prior series of acquisitions by a
respondent is an important element in determining the legality of a particular acquisition
under consideration." Id. at 1082.
36. 356 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
37. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 1973).
38. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066, 1072
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
39. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066, 1073
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
40. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 1973).
41. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
42. Id. at 602.
43. Id. at 602-03.
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purchasing officials. 4 4 Thus, the Supreme Court "left open the
door to the future viability of the 'solely for investment' statutory
exemption."" However, a corporation making an investment may
not use its shareholder position to influence purchasing relationships," even though the original stock purchase had been made
many years before.
DuPont appeared before the Supreme Court a second time in
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,47 to seek ap-

proval of duPont's plan to conform to the Court's earlier order of
divesture. While the government demanded complete divesture of
duPont's 23% interest in G.M., duPont suggested an alternative
plan, i.e. that the voting rights appurtenant to the G.M. shares
would not be exercised by duPont, but would "pass through" to
duPont shareholders in proportion to the shareholder's interest in
duPont. The corporation would divest itself of voting rights while
retaining other attributes of ownership such as the right to receive

dividends. 8
The Supreme Court rejected this proposal. Since the duPont

shareholders would vote the G.M. stock, dissolution of the corporation's "community of interest" would be unlikely.4e This decision
flowed from the conclusion that duPont voters would find it in
their best interest to induce General Motors to favor duPont. The
Court would not assume "contrary to all human experience" that
the duPont stockholders would not vote in their own self interest."

Since an improper purpose to affect the relationship of the two
44. Id. at 603. The duPont decision appears to be the only time the Supreme Court has
addressed the investment exemption issue, albeit tangentially. This fact was acknowledged
by the district court in Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F.Supp. 1210, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975):
The Court in duPont left open the door to the future viability of the 'solely for
investment' statutory exemption but cautioned against use of the investor status
to lessen competition: "when the purchase is solely for investment, the plain language of § 7 contemplates an action at any time the stock is used to bring about,
or attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition. 353 U.S. at
597-598."
45. Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F.Supp. 1210, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
46. Corporations may not use stock to influence purchasing relationships, nor may corporations use stock to influence selling relationships. United States v. Wilson Sporting
Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 555 (N.D. 111. 1968); United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.,
253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), afl'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966). See ANTTRUST ADViSOR,
supra note 6, at 137; 16A VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 6 § 11.07[31[a].
47. 366 U.S. 316 (1961). This decision involved the remedy for the previously determined
Clayton Act violation. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
48. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 328 (1961).
49. Id. at 331.
50. Id. at 332.
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corporations had been found, duPont was not allowed to maintain
any control over the shares. Apparently, forgoing the attributes
and privileges of ownership is insufficient to render an acquisition
exempt under the statute.
Summary of Factors
From this litigation history, it is possible to distill factors relevant to whether the "solely for investment purposes" exemption
will be recognized in a section 7 case. The acquisition must have
been solely for investment.8 ' A company's exercise of control over
another company through the purchase of stock precludes the possibility of coming within the investment exemption provision. Evidence of expressed intent to gain control of another corporation, "
as well as evidence of more subtle behavior which implies an intent
to establish control, may disqualify the acquisition from the exemption's protection. In addition, the acquiring company cannot
purchase stock with a view toward affecting a relationship between
themselves and the target company.58 Nor can the acquiring company attempt to gain representation on the Board of Directors of
the acquired corporation." The courts have recognized that such
representation would give access to business plans and confidential
information which would harm competition between companies.58
A corporation's history of acquisition also may evidence an intent
extending beyond a mere investment.56 Furthermore, the price
51. ANTITRUST ADVISOR 156 (C. Hills, ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as ANTrrRusT ADVISOR
19781; 16A VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 6 § 11.07[3][a].
52. See note 14, supra.
53. The acquiring company may not attempt to influence the purchasing requirements
or habits of the company in which it owns shares. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 353 U.S. 586, 602 (1957). (G.M. purchased virtually all its requirements for auto
finishes and fabrics from duPont, a 23% shareholder); Vanadium Corp. of America v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686, 693 (D. Del. 1962) (stock purchased to create a closer
relationship); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Co., 187 F. Supp. 545, 565 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (community antenna systems requirements for
parts and services were purchased from the company owning the system); American Crystal
Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), af'd, 259
F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958) (chairman of the board admitted that the purpose of the stock
purchase was to develop a "closer connection" between companies). Accord Dennison Mines
Ltd. v. Michigan Chem. Corp., 469 F.2d 1301, 1310 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (parties entered into a contract agreeing not to influence relationships); Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210,
1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (consent order).
54. See note 27 supra.
55. See note 27 supra.
56. Gulf & W. Indus. Inc. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066, 1072
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paid for the stock may be significant, particularly if the stock is
bought at a higher than normal rate.57 Finally, a pledge in a proxy

statement and merger agreement to keep the wholly owned subsidiary separate is not sufficient to qualify the acquisition for exemption, even though the corporation would be required to abide by
the proxy statement. 58

The courts have ostensibly based their decisions on objective behavior,5 9 but the decisions contain a subjective element as well."s
For example, the United States Supreme Court based its judgment
on "human experience" to infer that the shareholders were likely
to vote stock in their own self interest, thereby influencing

purchasing relationships."1 One district court balanced a proxy
statement pledge not to interfere with the subsidiary's management against the "known tendencies of human conduct. ' 'es Another
district court refused to recognize an exemption, concluding that a
finding of a mere investment purpose under the circumstances
would be "naive." 6 An essential element in these cases was credi-

bility of the expressed motivation for the acquisition. A crucial issue in these decisions was whether the defendants' actions viere
consistent with allegations of investment intent." Determining the

control factor, therefore, is as much a qualitative analysis as it is a
(S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187
F. Supp. 545, 572-576 (E.D. Pa. 1960), af'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); Hamilton
Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 314 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d
Cir. 1953); Foremost Dairies Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1082 (1962).
57. United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1966),
aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F.
Supp. 307, 312 (D. Conn.), afl'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953). Accord, Dennison Mines Ltd.
v. Michigan Chem. Corp., 469 F.2d 1301, 1308 (7th Cir. 1972).
58. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Sup. 543, 556 (N.D. I1. 1968).
See also notes 20-26 supra and accompanying text.
59. ATrrRuST ADviSoR, supra note 6, at 156. See also United States v. First Nat'l Bank,
310 F. Supp. 157, 161 (D. Md. 1970); Golden Grain Macaroni, 78 F.T.C. 63 (1971) "Whether
an acquisition is or is not for investment must be determined by objective, not subjective
standards. The investment exception otherwise could be employed to make Section 7 a nullity". Id. at 172.
60. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 310 F. Supp. 157, 161 (D. Md. 1970). But see
Golden Grain Macaroni, 78 F.T.C. 63, 172 (1971).
61. See note 53 supra.
62. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 556 (N.D. M. 1968).
63. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 316 (D. Conn.), aft'd,
206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
64. AwmusT ADvISOR 1978, supra note 51, at 158. Cf. Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411
F. Supp. 1210, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (court was persuaded by the testimony of Crane's chief
executive officer, by the Stipulation Agreement between the parties, and by representations
of counsel that Crane intended to hold Anaconda stock solely for investment).
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quantitative one. e5
Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co. AND United States v. Tracinda
Investment Corp.: RESURRECTION OF THE INVESTMENT EXEMPTION?
Prior to 1975, courts which specifically addressed claims that
stock acquisitions were exempt from antitrust claims because they
were solely an investment most frequently found that acquiring
companies were not merely making investments." Two recent decisions, Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co.87 and United States v.
Tracinda Investment Corp.," may mark the beginning of a trend
reversing this almost uniform rejection of the investment purposes
exemption.

65.

ANTrrRusT AnviSOR 1978, supra note 51, at 158:
In general, almost any corporate purchase of stock for investment may be challenged under Section 7 of the Clayton Act if the corporation acquiring the minority stock interest is likely to exert some influence on the corporation in whose
stock it has invested. The investment exemption will probably be available, if at
all, for relatively insubstantial stock investments when the acquiring firm seeks
solely passive financial participation, and there appears to be no danger whatsoever that management of the acquired firm will be influenced as a result of the
investment or that the firm making the investment will gain access to any confidential information.
Id. Compare United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1979) and
Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
66. See note 7, supra. But see Pennsylvania R. Co. v. ICC, 66 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1933),
aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 291 U.S. 651 (1934). The court found that the
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. had purchased the stock of Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. and Wabash Rail Co. solely for investment purposes. The court further found that competition was
not lessened by the stock acquisition. Rather, competition between the rail companies increased. The court insisted that it was "not primarily concerned with the economic result of
our interpretation of the statute ...
but to force all this stock suddenly upon the market
might have such a disasterous effect in these troublous times that it has caused us to consider most carefully the questions in this case." Id. at 40. See also Dennison Mines Ltd. v.
Michigan Chem. Corp., 469 F.2d 1301, 1309 n.15 (7th Cir. 1972); Texasgulf Inc. v. Canada
Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 407 (S.D. Tex. 1973). The decision turned on a finding of no
competition. The court observed that:
Section 7 specifically excludes from coverage stock purchases made solely for investment until the voting powers attendant to the stock are exercised to bring
about a lessening of competition. There was evidence at the hearing that while
CDC spoke in terms of "effective control" in its tender offer, it was mainly concerned with making a solid investment, and made no decision on changes it would
make by exerting control. Indeed some testimony indicated that even if they attained 35% of the stock, there was still a strong likelihood of them not getting
control since management would still control the proxy machinery. Thus, should
this in fact turn out to be an investment, Section 7 would be inapplicable.
Id. at 407 n.49.
67. Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
68. United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
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Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co.: The Initial Shift
In Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co.,69 Crane offered to exchange five
million shares of subordinated debentures, to be issued by Crane,
for Anaconda common stock. This would have given Crane 22.6%
ownership of Anaconda, and a dominant shareholder position.
Anaconda claimed that the exchange offer would violate section 707
because Crane directly competed with an Anaconda subsidiary.
Anaconda therefore sought a preliminary injunction to prevent
Crane from expanding its ownership of Anaconda stock.7 1
Responding to Anaconda's antitrust claim, Crane asserted that it
had no intention of obtaining control of Anaconda, and that the
acquisition of Anaconda stock was protected by the investment exemption. In support of this position, Crane submitted to the court
a "Stipulation" (which the court identified as a Consent Order)
whereby Crane pledged not to acquire more than the five million
shares of Anaconda Common stock pursuant to the Exchange Offer. This would limit Crane's control of shares to 22.6% of Anaconda stock. Crane pledged not to seek representation on Anaconda's Board of Directors so long as Crane owned any shares of
Anaconda. Crane further pledged to comply with section 7 and accepted a prohibition from voting its holdings to bring about or attempt to bring about a substantial lessening of competition. 7 ' The
Consent Order-Stipulation was broadly worded so as to insure
compliance by all Crane subsidiaries.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York accepted Crane's position and denied the preliminary injunction.
The Stipulation persuaded the court of Crane's sincerity to hold
Anaconda stock as an investment, and not to use the stock to
lessen competition. The court was "particularly persuaded"' by
the testimony of Crane's Chief Executive Officer, who ratified and
adopted the Stipulation in open court. The Stipulation also prohibited Crane from taking any action in its own business operations that would lessen competition with Anaconda. Furthermore,
of this Stipulation "would be punishable as
any violation
74
contempt.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

411 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1219.
Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1218.
Id.
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Although Crane had acquired a dominant shareholder position,
the court accepted the Stipulation as proof of a proper investment
purpose, notwithstanding that Crane competed directly with an
Anaconda subsidiary. In analyzing the application of the statutory
provision, the district court reasoned that once the defendant validly raised the "solely for investment" exemption, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant was presently using the stock to
substantially lessen competition. The absence of such evidence justified denial of injunctive relief. The court recognized, however, the
possibility that noninvestment motives might be uncovered at
trial. 5
This case reflects a combination of objective and subjective factors. 7 The objective action of entering the Stipulation in conjunction with the subjective assessment of the Chief Executive Officer's
testimony persuaded the court that Crane had validly raised the
exemption. Therefore, the burden of proof should shift to Anaconda to show an improper motive.
United States v. Tracinda Investment Corp.: The Two-Pronged
Test
The 1979 decision of United States v. Tracinda Investment
Corp.,7 extended the Anaconda analysis. The District Court for
the Central District of California developed what it termed a "twopronged test"76 to determine whether the investment exemption
provision applied. This test consisted of "(1) a factual determination of whether the acquisition was made solely for investment;
and (2) a factual determination of whether the stock is being used
by voting or otherwise to bring about or attempt to bring about a
'7 9
substantial lessening of competition.
Tracinda Investment Corp., owner of 42% of MGM Common

75.

In cases where the "solely for investment" exemption does not apply a plaintiff
need only show a reasonable probabilty of a lessening of competition. . . .Thus
the anti-competitive effects may be attacked in their incipiency. The statutory
exemption, however conspicuously omits this language. Once it is established to
the satisfaction of the Court that the acquisition is "solely for investment," the
statute requires a showing that the defendant is "using the (stock) by voting or
otherwise to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition.
Id. at 1219.
76. See notes 59-65 supra and accompanying text.
77. 477 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
78. Id. at 1099.
79. Id.
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stock, made a tender offer for 19% of Columbia Pictures' outstanding stock. Since Tracinda's sole shareholder, Kerkorian, also
personally owned six per cent of Columbia, this acquisition gave
Kerkorian effective control of 25% of Columbia.8" At the time the
tender offer was made, Kerkorian, Tracinda and Columbia entered
into a Stockholders' Agreement which was to remain in effect for a
three year period. The contract expressly stated that the stock was
purchased for investment purposes only and not to gain control
over Columbia. s" Kerkorian agreed to vote his stock in favor of
directors nominated by Columbia management, and to limit his
Columbia stock ownership and control to 25.5% .8 The court concluded that this agreement, on its face, raised the exemption issue,
irrespective of whether the defendant alleged the exemption as an
affirmative defense. 83
The Tracinda court relied on the statutory exemption to preclude liability under section 7." The contract and Kerkorian's testimony at trial supported the conclusion that the stock was purchased solely as an investment, thus satisfying the first prong of
the test. The court specifically noted the similarity between the
contract and the Anaconda-Crane Consent Order.85 Tracinda's
consent to the contract terms prior to any court action further supported the court's finding of an investment purpose. The limited
duration of the contract did not pose a problem, nor would the
court speculate as to what would happen at the close of the three
year period.86 The court reasoned that the length of the contract
did not reflect the parties' intent at the time of the agreement.8 7 In
fact, the brevity of the term was deemed consistent with an investment purpose because it indicated a desire for flexible planning."
In addition, the court found sufficient justification for a provi80. Id. at 1096. Tracinda's sole owner and director, Kirk Kerkorian, owned six per cent
of the outstanding common stock of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM). Tracinda owned 42%
of MGM's common stock. Thus Kerkorian controlled approximately 48% of MGM's common stock.
81. Id. at 1098-99.
82. Id. at 1098.
83. Id. See also note 6 supra.
84. Id. at 1101-02.
85. Id. at 1100.
86. Id. at 1100-01.
87. Id. at 1100.
88. Id. The contract provided for early termination should key management personnel
leave Columbia. This provision further evidenced an investment intent because it "clearly
illustrates defendant's undoubted commitment and loyalty to the present management of
Columbia." Id. at 1101.
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sion requiring Columbia management to consult with Kerkorian
regarding major financial decisions."9 It seemed only reasonable
that a major investor would wish to be kept informed of crucial
management decisions. Based on its own assessment of the calibre
and stature of Columbia top management, the court flatly rejected
any argument that Kerkorian could unduly influence Columbia
personnel. 90 Moreover, Kerkorian's individually-owned shares in
Columbia would give him the same access to management information and an opportunity to affect decision-making. By entering the
Stockholders' Agreement, Kerkorian voluntarily limited his personal rights of stock ownership. 91 The result of Tracinda may
therefore be attributable to the unique situation of Kerkorian as
an existing shareholder in Columbia, and Tracinda, Kerkorian's alter ego, acting as the acquiring company.
The government's failure to provide any evidence in support of
the second prong of the test led the court to summarily conclude
that no lessening of competition existed. 9 Although the decision
could have rested on the investment exemption, 3 the court examined the evidence of possible anticompetitive effects and con94
cluded that, under traditional tests, there were none.
Emergence of a New Analysis
The Tracinda and Anaconda decisions seem to represent a departure from the earlier decisions dealing with the investment purposes exemption issue. The impact of the decisions remains uncertain. Narrowly interpreted, the cases could be considered
aberrations from settled law. While the Anaconda court advanced

89. Id.
90. Id. The court characterized as "absurd" or "inconceivable" the government's arguments that the contract period and the consultation provision evidenced anything more
than an investment purpose.
91. When one considers that even if divesture were granted with respect to the
Tracinda stock, Kerkorian would still be a substantial stockholder with 5% and as
such would have access to the management in order to voice his opinion, the Government's position that the additional 19% of Columbia stock gives Kerkorian a
greater voice is absurd in view of the stature of the people in the management of
Columbia. Indeed, the acquisiton by Tracinda actualy undermines Kerkorian's position since the Stockholders' Agreement restricts the use of Kerkorian's stock, as
well as Tracinda's, while prior to that Agreement there were no resrictions on
Kerkorian's personal holdings.
Id. at 1101 n.9.
92. Id. at 1101.
93. Id. at 1102.
94. Id. at 1111.
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a well-reasoned analysis of the statutory provision, the court used
the exemption only to deny a preliminary injunction, while expressly leaving open the possibility that a noninvestment purpose
would be uncovered at trial." Tracinda was decided on the merits,
but the exemption issue in that case could easily be limited to its
peculiar set of facts and the relationship of the parties.""
These decisions could, however, be broadly interpreted as creatively considering and using the factors enumerated in earlier decisions in order to find that a particular acquisition qualifies for
the exemption. Tracinda and Anaconda seem to recognize and
take into account behavior that the courts have found inconsistant
with an investment purpose in order to analyze and objectively
conclude that investment motivation has been demonstrated. The
key factor in these two decisions seems to be the objective, written
promise not to exert control in order to inhibit competition,9
where the breach of that promise had measurable consequences."
The promise not to exert control over the acquired company is important because it is clear that any attempt at control removes the
acquisition from the solely for investment exemption." The written documents remove the necessity for the court to make a subjective determination of the acquiring company's intent based on
bbhavior and implied intent.
These cases also depart from the traditional approach of examining "human tendencies." The earlier decisions presumed that a
corporation which purchased any amount of stock in a competing
corporation did so with a view toward asserting control, and not
with a view toward investment. 10 0 In each case, the court looked
beyond the form of the purchase to the substance of the transaction. The opinions consistently have stated that a showing of numerical control is unnecessary because minority shareholders can
be expected to use the means available to them, such as cumulative voting, to attempt to elect directors or otherwise influence
95. Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
96. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
97. Cf. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 556 (N.D. Ill.
1968) (A pledge to shareholders in a proxy statement which the court recognized as an enforcible obligation was not sufficient evidence of investment purpose. This situation involved a purchase of the entire company, however, as a wholly owned subsidiary).
98. In Anaconda, the court noted that breach of the consent order would be contempt.
Presumably, breach of Tracinda's pledge would give rise to a breach of contract as well as
antitrust action.
99. See notes 51-65 supra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 27-31 supra and accompanying text.
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management. 10 1 Conversely, in Anaconda and Tracinda the courts
refused to look beyond the form of the agreements in each case.
The Anaconda Stipulation and the Tracinda Shareholders' Agreement were sufficient on their faces to establish that the purchases
were made solely for investment.120 The cases suggest a new presumption that, absent any showing to the contrary, the acquiring
corporation will abide by its investment purpose.
Both opinions also emphasized that the defendants had voluntarily limited their holdings of stock. The emphasis seems misplaced
in light of cases which stated that the numbers of shares held is
not a deciding factor in finding an attempt to control or otherwise
influence management.10 8 Anaconda and Tracinda seem to say,
however, that since the written agreements presumptively showed
an investment purpose, holdings as large as 25.5% can be held to
be an investment. How large an acquisition can be made consistent
with an investment purpose remains an open question.'"
A broad interpretation of Anaconda and Tracinda also raises
procedural questions. First, if the statutory provision is an exemption, as the Tracinda court insists, 0 5 then a plaintiff's suit could
be vulnerable to a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment. °6 If the provision is an affirmative defense, as has been
suggested,107 then the defendant will be required to plead the defense, thereby raising a question of fact which would necessitate a
full trial on the merits. The defendant would be required to plead
the affirmative defense or would waive the right to raise the issue
at trial.1 0' Second, if the defendant raised the issue of investment
purpose, either through pleadings or evidence, the burden of proof
would shift to the plaintiff to show that the exemption does not
09
apply.1
In the earlier decisions, the plaintiffs carried the burden of proof
only on the issue of showing a probable lessening of competition
resulting from the acquisitions in each situation in order to estab-

101. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
102. United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093, 1098-1100 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
103. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
104. Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 407 n.49 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
See note 66 supra.
105. See note 6 supra.
106. JAMES AND HAZARD, supra note 6, at 149-50.
107. See note 6 supra.
108. JAMES AND HAZARD, supra note 6, at 218-225.
109. Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See note 71 supra.
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lish a section 7 violation. Under Anaconda and Tracinda, once the
defendant successfully demonstrates that the acquisition was made
solely for investment purposes, the plaintiff would have to rebut
that evidence as well as satisfy the second prong of the two step
analysis, i.e., whether the defendant was using the stock by voting
or otherwise to bring about or attempt to bring about the substantial lessening of competition.
Finally, it should be remembered that the solely for investment
provision is stated in the present tense, exempting corporations
"purchasing" stock and "not using" it to bring about the substantial lessening of competition. This language indicates that the acquiring corporation must abide by its investment agreement. It
would seem that any later action inconsistent with an investment
purpose would remove the acquiring corporation from the exemption's protection. The acquiring company would no longer be sheltered from antitrust liability.
At this stage, several questions regarding the strength and scope
of the exemption remain unanswered. Until these questions are answered through case law development, corporations should be
aware of the provision's existence and consider it when starting a
program of acquisition or as a tool in defending a potential Section
7 challenge to an acquisition.
CONCLUSION

Historically, the courts have been extremely reluctant to accept
defendants' allegations that acquisitions of stock in competing corporations have been solely for investment. The courts have based
their decisions on assessment of defendants' objective behavior and
upon inferences drawn from perceived subjective motivation as
well. The cases establish a two-prong test: 1) a determination of
whether the acquisition was made solely for investment; and 2) a
determination of whether the stock is being used substantially to
lessen competition.
Corporations may be able, however, to protect themselves successfully from antitrust attack by placing voluntary, objective, visible restrictions upon their behavior in order to convince the court
of an investment motive. The limitation itself need not be extremely burdensome, nor of long duration. A writing alone may be
sufficient. What other kinds of restrictions or objective evidence
will be acceptable to the courts to show investment motive in any
given situation remains an open question. The continued development of these principles may establish the investment exemption
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as a viable and effective concept in antitrust litigation.
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